Proceedings of the 52nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences | 2019

Investing in Cyber Defense: A Value-Focused Analysis of Investment
Decisions for Microgrids
Bryan J. Hudgens
Naval Postgraduate School
bryan.hudgens@nps.edu

Cameron Hartner
United States Marine
Corps
Cameron.hartner@
usmc.mil

Abstract
To mitigate disruptions to commercial power
grids, and to achieve operational efficiencies by
managing energy use, many organizations are fielding
smaller, local, self-contained microgrids. The
computer control systems that operate the microgrids
create new vulnerabilities to a rapidly-escalating
array of cyber attacks. This creates a tension between
the need to improve energy assurance and efficiency
through microgrids, and the need to protect against
cyber attacks that can disrupt and damage the
organization’s energy systems. Through a series of
interviews with subject matter experts and end-users,
this exploratory study surfaces the decision-makers’
important values in this decision space and develops a
network of those values to guide decision-makers to
make better decisions in balancing these competing
needs.

1. Background
As disasters, such as Superstorm Sandy in the
Northeastern United States demonstrate, even
relatively brief lack of energy can curtail critical
services
including
transportation,
healthcare,
communication and security [4]. Protecting critical
infrastructures, such as energy, has become a national
security issue, e.g., [13], [15], [34]. Reliance on
commercial power grids is important for the United
States (US) Department of Defense (DoD), which is
the United States’ top consumer of electricity, and
which relies on the commercial power grid to supply
essentially all its electrical power, including power to
91% of its “most critical” infrastructure [8]. The DoD
is vulnerable to natural and intentional outages and
“[i]n 2015 alone…experienced approximately 127
outages that lasted 8 hours or longer, caused
by…weather and equipment failure” [8].
One way to address this vulnerability is through
microgrids – smaller, local, power grids that can
function in concert with, or isolated from, commercial
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power grids [19]. Because they can operate
independently of commercial grids they can provide
electricity when commercial grids are down [2], [19],
[25]. They provide capability for operational
management of the local grid that can lower costs [19].
These benefits come at a cost, however, because
microgrids rely on computerized control systems to
govern their activity, and these control systems
introduce the potential vulnerability to cyber threats
[2]. Control systems, or Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) systems, have the capability to
adjust the energy system [5], [16]. Such SCADA
systems are often interoperable, which improves the
potential benefit via information sharing and greater
efficiencies, but also increases the risks of cyber
intrusion, as instances such as the Havex attacks
beginning in 2013 [15] and the Ukraine cyber attacks
of 2015 [15], [34] demonstrate. As the DoE notes [8],
from 2001 to 2015, the number of devices connected
to the internet grew from 400 million to 25 billion.
Concomitant with this growth in connects has come an
increase in cyber threats and attacks [13], [14], [15],
[21]. Attackers include both state and non-state actors
[15], and experts expect attacks to continue [34].
Decisions about control system cyber security
often require trade-offs between greater resilience and
greater vulnerability, and the impacts of cyber-security
interventions are difficult to evaluate [31]. For
example, is providing off-site access to a control
system good, as it allows installation personnel to
quickly repair problems, or is it bad as it creates an
additional vulnerability to cyber attack? Is the cost of
one worth the benefit of the other?
In the context of Navy installations, we explore
the values of energy managers and control system
engineers responsible for making these decisions at
US Navy installations. Using Value-Focused Thinking
(VFT) [17], we interview these stakeholders to
identify, synthesize and organize the relevant values.
This process can lead stakeholders to identify values
that might not be explicit, and how values contribute
to the organization’s fundamental values. For
example, in our study, cyber security is only a means
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to the end of providing reliable energy to sustain the
mission at bases. Understanding this can help clarify
whether interventions that reduce cyber-vulnerability
are worth any degradation of functionality of the
energy system. In addition, VFT can reduce the
perceived tension between competing values and lead
stakeholders to identify creative alternatives that
improve all objectives. In adopting this approach, we
follow other information scholars, e.g., [10], [27], and
[30], who have used it to understand information
systems security; we contribute to this conversation by
exploring this approach in a context requiring
important trade-offs which can have significant
national and international security implications.
Keeney’s value-focused thinking [17] formulates
decisions not as problems, but as opportunities.
Keeney defines values as “principles used…to
evaluate the actual or potential consequences of action
and inaction, of proposed alternatives, and of
decisions.” [17, loc. 157]. Value-focused thinking
seeks to surface values that decision-makers hold,
perhaps implicitly. These implicit values, when
considered explicitly, often present unconsidered
objectives that can lead to new, also unconsidered
opportunities for potentially better solutions.
Objectives, on Keeney’s view, are simply “a statement
of something someone desires to achieve” [17, loc.
482]. Objectives take two forms: fundamental
objectives are “essential reason[s] for interest in a
decision situation” [17, loc. 482], whereas means
objectives simply enable achieving fundamental
objectives [17]. Additionally, value-focused thinking
encourages decision-makers to clarify their values
explicitly, both in terms of definitions and in terms of
a hierarchy of importance, which can lead to more
measurable decision objectives and outcomes, which
in turn enables more measurable costs and benefits to
trade against each other in making better decisions.
In our study, we formulate the decision
opportunity as, “which cyber product(s) do we buy to
protect our control system and microgrid?” In
formulating the decision opportunity this way, we
extend Dhillon & Torkzadeh’s research [10] on the
value of information security, who note that
information security lacks an inherent value
proposition, by providing an explicit trade-off, the
benefits of increased energy assurance. This insight –
that cyber security is a means to an end – reliable
energy – emerged from this work as well.

2. Research approach
We recruited our participants by identifying
organizations in US Navy installations that both work
with control systems and have a primary mission to

provide energy services. We interviewed nine
participants from three organizations [18], [29],
representing a purposeful sample [6], [28] of facility
managers and engineers responsible for making and/or
informing decisions about cyber security of US Navy
energy SCADA systems; these participants are both
potential end-users as well as subject matter experts in
the area. While representative of personnel at other US
Navy installations, and reasonably representative of
those at other DoD installations, these personnel in
some ways represent an extreme case relative to nonDoD organizations [28] in that the consequences of
losing energy assurance can lead to serious national
and international security consequences [7].
During these interviews, we elicited values and
objectives, and the participants clarified those values
and objectives; we then organized the objectives into
a means-ends network, in which we present the
objectives graphically in a relational hierarchy [17].
The contribution of the analysts was to get participants
thinking about the issues, eliciting expressions of
value, clarifying into objectives, and organizing their
objectives according to how and why they are
important.
We developed an initial comprehensive interview
protocol of eleven possible questions, based on
previous research (particularly, e.g., [20], but our
literature review more broadly). In practice, we
narrowed the protocol to the first three questions,
based on time constraints for each interview (three
primary questions typically generated an hour-long
interview for a participant). These questions were
designed to surface values relating to SCADA system
performance generally, SCADA system performance
under cyber attack, and potential worst-case
consequences of such an attack. Our original interview
protocol included these eleven questions:
1.
2.

3.
4.

5.
6.

7.

List what is important to you regarding the
performance of CS networks.
Describe the ideal performance of a
microgrid under a cyberattack (or
electrical grid if no microgrid).
List the consequences of a worst-case
scenario (within reason).
List what is important to you regarding
cybersecurity performance for CS
networks.
What are your current concerns relating to
security threats on CS networks?
What can be done to raise awareness of
cybersecurity threats on CS networks?
(Maitland et al., 2013)
What are some of the issues that prevent the
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8.
9.
10.

11.

effectiveness of CS networks? (Maitland
et al., 2013)
How would you evaluate cybersecurity
threats on CS networks?
How would you evaluate your vulnerability
to cyber threats?
What would you tell other energy engineers
to do to maintain cybersecurity, CS
networking performance?
What can the owners of commercial-run
power plants do to increase safety against
cybersecurity threats?

We recorded participant answers on white board
for ease of reference, and then asked two follow-up
questions designed to clarify their answers and to
convert their answers into objectives: “why is that
important?”, which helps identify fundamental
objectives, and “what do you mean by that?”, which
helps identify means objectives [17], [20]. We
captured the raw interview data for future analysis.

3. Analysis and results
3.1. Applying value-focused thinking
To illustrate our interview approach, a common
initial answer to our question about consequences – an

answer consistent with the extreme sample - was either
“death” or “casualties”. Participants typically clarified
this answer (“what do you mean by that?”) to an
objective of “minimizing casualties”, and then
explained (“why is that important?”) casualties meant
loss of life, a fundamental failure and thus a
fundamental objective. (Casualties, our participants
explained, can affect mission accomplishment, but
moreover, casualties from our participants’ view, are
inherently bad.) Similarly, another typically important
aspect of SCADA system performance was
“maximize resiliency”, which our participants
clarified meant “minimizing down time”. This
clarification process helped distinguish resilience from
other characteristics, such as durability and flexibility;
for our participants, resilience referred to responding
to a problem (how long until it is resolved?), whereas
flexibility referred to preventing outages and
managing reductions in capability to sustain the most
important functions.
From our interviews, we developed a means-ends
network, graphically displaying the fundamental, or
ends objectives in the smaller grouping at the top; the
means objectives in the larger grouping; and their
hierarchical interrelationships, represented by arrows
showing how lower-level means objectives lead to
higher-level objectives (see Figure 1). We discuss
each objective below.
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Figure 1: Means-ends objective network

3.2. Fundamental objectives
Our participants surfaced four fundamental
objectives, which were common to all nine
participants: maximizing reliability, maximizing
reputation, minimizing cost, and minimizing
casualties; two of these ends objectives contribute to a
third ends objective, with maximizing reliability and
minimizing costs contributing to maximizing the
organization’s reputation. The participants also
surfaced a strategic fundamental objective,
maximizing installation support, roughly defined as
“providing the best possible energy support necessary
to accomplish the mission”. This defines the reason for
operating the installations, thus it is a strategic
objective, one of a “decision maker’s broadest

objectives” [17, loc 2348]. We discuss each
fundamental objective in turn.
3.2.1.

Maximize reliability

Each participant initially defined this objective
somewhat differently, based in part on their
organization, its mission, and their role in that
organization. A synthesis of their definitions,
however, is very similar to “the ability of an energy
production system to provide consistent and expected
levels of energy under stated conditions for a specified
period of time” [12]. Participants identified several
recurring means objectives as contributing to
maximizing reliability, including minimizing outages,
maximizing regulatory compliance, maximizing
resilience and maximizing flexibility.
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3.2.2.

Maximize reputation

The participants all expressed a belief that their
organization’s reputation was both valuable and
important. This was initially surprising as reputation
does not immediately seem fundamental to Navy
installations. However, several participants expressed
that without the trust of their customers – those
depending on installation services – the customers
would stop relying on them which would degrade their
ability to do the mission and incur additional costs.
This fundamental objective appears to manifest two
other fundamental objectives, maximizing reliability
and minimizing cost. This is consistent with a general
belief that government functions better when the
public trusts it [24].
3.2.3.

Minimize cost

All nine participants mentioned minimizing costs
– labor, materials, time, and money – as important.
SCADA systems contribute to greater efficiency, thus
decreasing costs, and microgrids provide redundancy
against commercial grid outages. One participant
noted that by keeping energy costs low, that provider
was able to bill its customers on the installation at a
lower cost, thus preserving its customers’ resources to
spend on their organizational missions.
3.2.4.

Minimize casualties

Perhaps because of the larger Navy and DoD
missions, all participants were concerned with
preventing death and casualties. This belief appears
based in part on both regulatory guidance and
experience. Safety is a “vital enabler” to the mission
[23], and [3] reports over 150 deaths per year are
related to electrical systems.

3.3. Means objectives
The nine participants identified twenty-four
means objectives, organized in a network in figure 1.
While all participants agreed on the four fundamental
objectives, not every participant mentioned every
means objective. Here, we discuss six of the most
important means objectives, including the mostfrequently mentioned means objectives, maximizing
resilience, minimizing labor, maximizing regulatory
compliance, maximizing flexibility, minimizing cyber
vulnerability and minimizing control system
complexity. As means objectives move further away
from fundamental objectives they can become more
like options or alternatives – the kill switch objective
in the bottom left of Figure 1 is an example. We

generally kept the network to objectives, stopping
before specifying decision-specific alternatives or
options (parts of alternatives).
3.3.1.

Maximize resilience

All nine participants viewed resilience as an
important means objective, contributing directly to
two ends objectives, maximizing reliability and
minimizing costs. As discussed elsewhere, resilience
for our participants meant recovering from disruptions
[9]. Control systems maximize resilience, e.g., by
minimizing response times in disruptions, and
identifying the location and likely cause of
disruptions, this minimizing problem-solving, troubleshooting, and repair times. Participants observed that
redundancy improves resilience. Finally, one
participant noted that having the ability to disconnect
the control system and use manual controls was an
important aspect of resilience.
3.3.2.

Minimize labor

SCADA systems increase efficiency, thus
reducing the amount of labor required to do a job [33],
and ultimately contributing to the ends objective of
minimizing costs. For example, these systems can
minimize necessary maintenance and optimize
maintenance times. Such labor savings were important
to all nine participants.
3.3.3.

Maximize regulatory compliance

Regulatory compliance enables both cost
minimization and greater reliability. One participant
noted that compliance avoids costs, an ends objective;
to illustrate this, the Navy installation at Joint Base
Pearl Harbor paid a fine approaching $100,000 based
on an environmental violation [22]. This fine reduced
resource available for other needs, including ensuring
reliable energy, another ends objective.
3.3.4.

Maximize flexibility

Our participants believed greater flexibility
increased reliability, an important ends objective. A
flexible control system can maintain its distribution
despite supply and demand fluctuations [26], thus
contributing to reliability. The greater availability of
renewable energy sources, such as hydroelectricity and
solar, increase, energy systems has increased the need
for flexibility as well [26].
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3.3.5.

Minimize cyber vulnerability

All nine participants surfaced concerns about
cyber vulnerabilities, but not all nine agreed on the
magnitude of those vulnerabilities. Some were more
concerned with nation state attacks, such as that on the
Ukraine, while others discussed non-state hackers as a
threat. All agreed that minimizing physical and
network access is an important safeguard. This means
objective contributes directly and indirectly to several
other means objectives, and ultimately to both
maximizing reliability and minimizing costs as ends
objectives.
3.3.6.

Minimize control system complexity

Our participants noted that minimizing control
system complexity is an important means objective
that contributes to minimizing errors and updates, both
of which operate through several other ends objectives
to reduce reliability and increase costs.

3.4. Identifying tradeoffs
Our participants routinely identified two
important trade-offs they must consider in making
decisions in this context. First, they consider trade-offs
between functionality and security. Perhaps based on
their functional backgrounds, our respondents viewed
functionality and security as potentially-competing
objectives; improving security, in their view, could
require decreasing functionality. For example, while
providing off-site access to the system might enable
managers to respond quickly to failures, it would also
create an access point for a cyber attacker. As one
participant noted, “The most secure system is one that
doesn’t work.” All nine participants agreed on what
functionality and security mean, and that both
functionality and security are important; they were
divided on how to balance the trade-off between the
two considerations.
Participants’ preferences on the best way to
balance the trade-off seems to be related to the
participant’s role in the organization. A correlation
that appeared in our small sample is that those with
greater responsibility, e.g., over many installations,
seemed to weigh (cyber)security as a greater (but not
overriding) need. Conversely, an engineer responsible
for one installations’ system, with a primary concern
of ensuring customers had the power necessary to
perform their missions, reported a greater (but again
not overriding) concern for functionality. Rather than
worrying over cybersecurity, this participant reported
that their installation lost power to an entire circuit
when a gecko electrocuted itself on a wire; this

participant was more concerned about making
investments that would ensure uninterrupted access
against these non-cyber disruptions. Regardless of
their respective roles in the organization, all
participants agreed that the two considerations must be
weighed in every situation.
The second trade-off our participants commonly
noted was between user control and automated
control. While not a universal consideration for all
nine participants, the importance of being able to
assume manual control was very important to some
participants.

4. Discussion, conclusions, limitations,
and recommendations
Our participants’ means-ends objective network
tells a story. Their overarching mission is to maximize
installation support, and that involves maximizing four
fundamental, or ends, objectives: developing the
reputation of providing reliable energy at minimal
cost, while minimizing casualties. A hierarchy of
means objectives contribute to achieving these ends
objectives, and thus their mission.
All our participants were clearly oriented towards
the strategic objective of mission support, but they
were split on how best to achieve it. While the network
in Figure 1 accurately reflects the relationships among
the ends and means objectives, it does not necessarily
reflect each participant’s individual ends objectives,
nor does it reflect the relative importance – which
differed among participants – they apply to those
objectives.
That said, achieving this balance is important, and
we suggest subject matter experts closer to the end
user – where the mission is actually supported – are
best able to make these tradeoffs, with those higher in
the organization providing oversight of the decisions.
Our participants valued customer support; they
believed maximizing reliability is an important ends
objective. Cybersecurity was important to varying
degrees to all participants, but for all it was clearly a
means objective – important because it influences the
other objectives, and the ability to meet the mission,
i.e. maximize installation support. All participants
were very cognizant of the installation’s mission,
especially the most critical functions. One of the
benefits of VFT and understanding which objectives
are means (vs. ends) and which ends they contribute to
is that it can help stakeholders reduce focus on tension
and trade-offs and instead identify new alternatives or
“potential choices to pursuing your [means]
objectives,” which can increase the ability to achieve
the fundamental objectives [32].
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Our study focuses on three naval installations.
We’ve suggested our sample is reasonably
representative of other military installations, but the
small sample size is nonetheless a limitation of our
study. Future research should explore whether and
how our findings apply to other installations across all
services, and to organizations beyond the military. Our
results also suggest that decision-makers’ values can
depend on their position and role in the organization,
but our sample clearly limits our ability to draw strong,
well-supported conclusions. Future studies could
address how the position and role in organizational
hierarchies influences the development of ends-means
objectives.
Ongoing and future research can consider how
best to implement the means-ends network and the
tradeoffs. For example, ongoing research within the
Navy is formulating a return on investment model for
cybersecurity investment based on user values.
Different decision-making approaches can also inform
the analysis. For example, multiple-objective decision
analysis [11] can assess qualitative outputs, such as
value focused thinking delivers, quantitatively.
Finally, future research might explore developing
standard measures the means and ends objectives we
identify.
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